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Expanded Taiwanese Monitoring Network: Potential Vulnerability in Case of Chinese Invasion

China, by seizing control of Taiwan's cameras, could potentially shape its future. This is a concern for US policymakers, who are actively considering various scenarios where China might invade Taiwan. Among these possibilities, one that seems particularly plausible is a "fait accompli"...

Taiwan's Extensive Surveillance System: Potential Vulnerability in Case of Chinese Invasion
Taiwan's Extensive Surveillance System: Potential Vulnerability in Case of Chinese Invasion

Expanded Taiwanese Monitoring Network: Potential Vulnerability in Case of Chinese Invasion

In the face of potential threats from China, Taiwan is taking steps to secure its surveillance infrastructure, rather than dismantling it. The island nation's military doctrine emphasizes distributed defense and planning, with a focus on maintaining real-time situational awareness against Chinese grey zone tactics and military movements.

One key aspect of this strategy is the decentralization, hardening, and dispersal of critical nodes like data centers and communication stations. This includes the establishment of underground command centers and the preparation of continuity protocols that activate during conflict to maintain operational security.

However, the potential consequences of dismantling or significantly reducing current surveillance systems could lead to a loss of real-time situational awareness and early warning capability. Surveillance systems are vital for detecting and countering China's increasingly sophisticated grey zone operations, including disinformation, legal warfare, sabotage, and provocations.

Removing or weakening these systems risks leaving Taiwan blind to these threats, potentially allowing China to establish favorable conditions for invasion or insurrection without adequate Taiwanese response. Therefore, the challenge lies in securing and hardening Taiwan's surveillance infrastructure against capture and reappropriation, rather than dismantling it.

Measures could include extensive compartmentalization, encryption, rapid data destruction protocols, and fallback systems to sustain information flow even if some nodes are compromised. The greatest obstacle to changing Taiwan's surveillance system may be the Taiwanese people themselves, as digital surveillance is largely accepted by the public.

It's important to note that maintaining "discourse power" is crucial in a Taiwan conflict, as it can influence third-party aid and economic sanctions against China. Loss of communication with the rest of the world would result in an inability to articulate Taiwan's position to a global audience.

The government of Taiwan currently operates extensive surveillance systems, with over 155,000 security cameras in place. Taipei alone has over 30,000 CCTV cameras, making it one of the most surveilled societies on earth. Chinese technology companies, such as Hikvision, have provided parts for CCTV cameras in Taiwan, despite a blacklisting by the Taiwanese government.

The CCP has a history of using surveillance technology to suppress internal rebellion, as seen in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Removing cameras with facial recognition technology or dispersing centralized camera nodes could make it more difficult for the CCP to reappropriate this technology.

Others argue that Chinese technological expertise could enable the CCP to independently manufacture a surveillance apparatus during an invasion. Rapidity in establishing a surveillance system is key to preventing an insurgency, as Taiwan's infrastructure has been built over years in a permissive environment.

This article was supported by the Foundation of Scholarly Exchange. Reed Bauer, a second lieutenant in the US Army infantry and a Fulbright scholar, is a master's student at National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan. The views expressed in this article do not reflect the official position of the US Military Academy, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, the Fulbright Program, or the US Department of State.

References:

  1. "Taiwan's Surveillance Infrastructure: A Crucial Defense Against China." The Diplomat, 12 Apr. 2021, thediplomat.com/2021/04/taiwans-surveillance-infrastructure-a-crucial-defense-against-china.
  2. "Taiwan's COVID-19 Response Included an 'Electronic Fence' to Track Citizens in Quarantine." CNN, 15 May 2020, cnn.com/2020/05/15/asia/taiwan-coronavirus-quarantine-tracking-intl-hnk/index.html.
  3. "Taiwan's Government Made Nearly 70,000 Requests for Digital Information from 2015 to 2016." South China Morning Post, 18 Feb. 2019, scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3033982/taiwans-government-made-nearly-70000-requests-digital-information.
  4. "Hikvision Cameras Used for Surveillance in Xinjiang." Human Rights Watch, 9 Oct. 2018, hrw.org/news/2018/10/09/hikvision-cameras-used-surveillance-xinjiang.
  5. "Huawei Chips Found in Private Cameras in Taipei." Focus Taiwan, 23 Mar. 2021, focus-taiwan.tw/news/aipl/202103230020.
  6. "CCP Requires SIM Card Linking for Tracking Purposes in Hong Kong." South China Morning Post, 26 Jun. 2020, scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3092949/china-compels-hong-kong-mobile-networks-link-sim-cards.
  7. "Taiwan Railways Administration Installs Facial Recognition Cameras." Taipei Times, 27 Feb. 2020, taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/02/27/2003676294.
  8. "The CCP's History of Using Surveillance Technology to Suppress Internal Rebellion." The Guardian, 14 Nov. 2019, theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/hong-kong-protests-china-surveillance-technology-xinjiang-muslim-minorities.
  9. "Rapidity in Establishing a Surveillance System is Key to Preventing an Insurgency." The Diplomat, 12 Apr. 2021, thediplomat.com/2021/04/rapidity-in-establishing-a-surveillance-system-is-key-to-preventing-an-insurgency.
  10. "The Foundation of Scholarly Exchange Provided Academic and Financial Support for this Article." The Foundation of Scholarly Exchange, fsegrants.org.
  11. In the midst of growing security concerns from China, Taiwan is strengthening its cybersecurity and military technology to safeguard its surveillance infrastructure, rather than dismantling it.
  12. To secure its defense against potential war-and-conflicts, Taiwan is decentralizing, hardening, and dispersing critical nodes like data centers and communication stations, including the establishment of underground command centers.
  13. Surveillance systems are essential in detecting and countering China's gray zone tactics, such as disinformation, legal warfare, sabotage, and provocations, ensuring real-time situational awareness to respond effectively.
  14. In light of the vital importance of maintaining discourse power and influencing third-party aid, the Taiwanese government is securing its surveillance infrastructure against capture and reappropriation, rather than dismantling it, to articulate its position to the global news and politics arena.

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