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Uncovered Secret Access Point in ATM System through Raspberry Pi

Underhood ATM Hack Leverages Raspberry Pi, Deploying Stealthy Malware and Advanced Anti-Detection Mechanisms in Bank Systems

ATM Network infiltrated through Raspberry Pi, revealing concealed access point
ATM Network infiltrated through Raspberry Pi, revealing concealed access point

Uncovered Secret Access Point in ATM System through Raspberry Pi

In a recent cybersecurity incident, the UNC2891 threat group, known for targeting ATM infrastructure, successfully infiltrated a bank's internal network. The attackers used a Raspberry Pi device equipped with a 4G modem, allowing them remote access over mobile data.

The malware's concealment technique, now recognised in MITRE ATT&CK as T1564.013, relied on abusing Linux bind mounts. This allowed the backdoor to hide from process listings, making it difficult for security measures to detect.

Physical access was also a part of the attackers' strategy. UNC2891 connected a Raspberry Pi device to a network switch shared with an ATM. The device served as a crucial pivot point for lateral movement across the internal environment, with backdoor processes establishing connections to the Raspberry Pi and the bank's internal mail server.

The attackers installed a custom backdoor called TINYSHELL, which provided persistent external access and allowed the device to communicate continuously with command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. TINYSHELL established outbound connections via a dynamic DNS domain, further obscuring the attackers' infrastructure changes and avoiding disruption.

Deeper analysis revealed a stealthy malware component masquerading as a legitimate system process named "lightdm". Two instances of "lightdm" were found running from unusual locations, /tmp/lightdm and /var/snap/.snapd/lightdm. The malware aimed to deploy a rootkit called CAKETAP on the ATM switching server to manipulate hardware security modules and facilitate fraudulent ATM withdrawals.

In response to this incident, Group-IB has recommended several measures to enhance security. These include monitoring mount and unmount syscalls, alerting on /proc/[pid] mounted to tmpfs or external filesystems, blocking or monitoring binaries executed from /tmp or .snapd directories, securing all physical switch ports and ATM-connected infrastructure, and capturing memory images during incident response.

This case demonstrates the evolving tactics of financially motivated attackers, using physical access, obscure Linux features, and memory-resident malware to undermine well-defended systems. It serves as a reminder for organisations to stay vigilant and adapt their security measures to counter emerging threats.

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